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Abstract (150 words) 
This paper examines the impact of Brexit on the financial services regulation in relation 
to three areas linked to executive remuneration. They include: the bonus cap, the 
clawback of pay and the level of disclosure needed by shareholders regarding details of 
directors’ remuneration. It will be argued that legally, Brexit will have little impact on 
all three areas. UK legislation has already incorporated a great deal of EU legislation. 
Status quo of retaining such legal restrictions seems sensible in light of public sentiment 
towards unfairness in executive compensation and uncertainty towards the Brexit 
negotiations. Nevertheless, London faces stiff competition from other major 
international financial centres in a post-Brexit era. The loss of single passporting rights 
is also encouraging major banks to invest in other European financial centres. Brexit 
creates opportunities too. With the integration of digital technology, it is possible to 
create convenient platforms where investors can read reports on executive 
remuneration. 
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1. Introduction 
 
‘Brexit means Brexit’ is possibly the most common catchphrase of 2016. That was the 
year Britain voted to leave the European Union. Against the Brexit backdrop, there is 
great uncertainty about the precise future of a number of factors within the UK financial 
sector. One of them is executive remuneration. The controversy over executive pay has 
been around for some time; for years we have been told that banks and other financial 
institutions over-reward their staff. We have also been told that ill-thought 
remuneration designs can lead to unfair transfers of value from companies, their 
shareholders and other stakeholders, to executives, and can also affect companies’ long-
term sustainability.1 For this reason, in order to transform the bonus and excessive pay 
culture of European Banks, the European Commission has adopted a number of critical 
measures over the past few years.2 These have proven popular on a continent struggling 
to emerge from the ruins of the recent and most catastrophic financial crisis. However, 
there is now great concern over the fate of the UK remuneration and bonus policies, 
particularly within the City of London; a city where the pay and bonus culture is a 
breeding ground for controversy and where the predominant remuneration ‘ethos’ is 
often viewed as a contributing factor for reckless and excessive risk-taking.3 The reason 
for the concern is this: Europe has heavily influenced the UK’s domestic rules such as 
the malus provisions, bonus clawback and bonus caps; the UK Remuneration Codes in 
fact, derive much of their current form from the European regulations. 4 Topical and 
crucial questions therefore are: what will the UK’s exit from the European Union mean 
for the country’s remuneration policies? Does the EU continue to influence the way 
UK-based firms remunerate their high-level employees and if so, what would change 
following the public’s decision to leave the EU? 
 
It could be said that there are two sides to the same coin here. On the one hand, under 
the UK’s current political climate there is probably little appetite for introducing 
changes to the remuneration rules. There is a plethora of reasons for this. To start with, 
despite a succession of rules aimed at curtailing excessive rewards (particularly since 
the emergence of the 2008 financial crisis) there has not been a noteworthy decrease in 
                                                 
1 L. Bebchuk, J. Fried, ‘Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of 
Executive Compensation’ (Harvard University Press 2004); S. Thompson, ‘Executive 
Pay and Corporate Governance Reform in the UK: What Has Been Achieved?’, in 
R.S. Thomas, J.G. Hill (eds), Research Handbook on Executive Pay (Edward Elgar 
Publishing Ltd 2010).  
2 Commission Recommendations 2004/913/EC, 2005/162/EC, 2009/385/EC, 
(2013/36/EU) (CRD). 
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:120:0028:0031:E
N:PDF accessed 20 February 2016. 
3 A. Lui “Greed, recklessness and/or dishonesty? An investigation into the culture of  
five UK banks between 2004 and 2009” (2015) 16(2) Journal of Banking Regulation 
106 
4 These are implemented in the UK through the FCA Remuneration Code, which 
makes recommendations on the structure of remuneration for risk taking staff and 
requires aggregate disclosure of amounts paid to these staff: FCA Remuneration 
Code, FSA’s Senior Management Arrangements, Systems and Controls (SYSC) 
sourcebook <http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/SYSC/19A > accessed 10 
April 2016. 
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senior executives’ pay. On the contrary; pay has continued to increase despite the so-
called shareholder spring of 2012.5 Furthermore, businesses have dedicated significant 
time and effort adjusting to new rules and legislation. There is also the need to consider 
the impact that drastic changes can have on the investor community: irrespective of 
Brexit, investors need to feel confident that they operate within a favorable investment 
climate; any existing rules that help enhance investor confidence will not be abandoned 
so hastily. Britain is not experiencing the right political climate that would justify 
deserting policies that target poor remuneration policies and designs. Progressive 
measures have entered EU and UK law as part of a wider overhaul of capital rules in 
order to help strengthen investor protection, bring more stability into the banking 
system and reduce risky speculation; why would the UK government want to deviate 
from the existing rules, willingly agreeing to undergo an extensive revision of its 
remuneration laws and regulations? But there is also the other side of the coin. The side 
that suggests that Brexit can provide the perfect opportunity for the City to shine. 
Industry participants would argue that Britain can benefit from freeing itself of certain 
EU regulations, particularly those that the City did not want in the first place. Some of 
the more unwelcome areas of EU regulation, such as the controversial bankers’ bonus 
cap under the Capital Requirements Directive IV (2013/36/EU), could be altered or 
scrapped altogether and Brexit can finally grant Britain the chance to expand its global 
footprint without the need to obey a tsunami of EU directives.  
 
This article will focus on the possible impacts of Brexit on the financial services 
regulation in relation to three areas linked to executive remuneration: the capping of 
banker’s bonuses, a policy pushed forward by the Europeans as part of their most 
comprehensive banking reforms to date, the clawback of pay, by which money 
already paid are returned under certain conditions and finally the level of disclosure 
needed by shareholders regarding details of directors’ remuneration and the extent to 
which shareholder approval is needed. The key question is whether these European 
initiatives can survive the Brexit currents or whether their ‘demolition’ will eventually 
prove unavoidable.  
 
2. Britain: Be Aware of Brexit? 
 
There is a firm framework in Europe regulating executive remuneration that mitigates 
the impact of excessive risk-taking. The EU regulators made a direct attempt to 
eradicate “rewards for failure" in the financial sector through a variety of measures. 
Central to these, the Capital Requirements Directive: directly applicable to firms across 
the EU, and implemented through national law and the Capital Requirements 
                                                 
5 According to the latest data from the High Pay Centre, Britain’s top executives have 
continued to receive pay rises despite greater scrutiny of executive rewards. The 
average pay for a FTSE 100 CEO rose to £5.480 million in 2015, an increase from 
£4.964 million in 2014 and significantly higher than the £4.129 million in 2010. The 
calculation was based on the ‘single figure’ pay disclosure of 62 top flight firms that 
have published their remuneration reports for the 2015 financial year. This ‘single 
figure’ comprises of the executive salary, bonus, long term incentives and pensions: 
The State of Pay: High Pay Centre Briefing on Executive Pay (2016) 
<http://highpaycentre.org/files/The_State_of_Pay_2015.pdf> accessed 18 August 
2017.  
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Regulation6, the purpose of the CRD IV package is to provide a 'single rulebook' across 
the EU covering regulatory capital requirements, corporate governance and penalties. 
CRD IV brings the EU into line with the Basel III rules on banking standards, which 
introduce greater requirements for the quality and quantity of capital, new rules for 
counterparty risk, new liquidity and leverage requirements, and new macroprudential 
standards including a countercyclical capital buffer and capital buffers for institutions 
that have systematically demonstrated their significance. They also contain changes to 
rules on corporate governance, including remuneration, and introduce a standardised 
EU regulatory reporting.7 According to the Capital Requirements Directive, banks and 
investment firms must implement remuneration policies that are consistent with 
effective risk management. Remuneration policies must not promote risk-taking that 
surpasses the level of accepted risk of a particular institution. In addition, a clear 
distinction must be drawn between the criteria for setting fixed and variable pay: fixed 
remuneration must be permanent, pre-determined, non-discretionary and non-revocable 
whilst variable pay must depend on performance; institutions must be in a position to 
explain and justify to their stakeholders the use of any variable remuneration 
component. These rules are binding on all EU Member States; they apply to all E.U. 
banks, the E.U. operations of foreign banks and institutions, and third-country 
subsidiaries of E.U. banks (but largely not to hedge funds which are governed by 
separate legislation). They give the right to national banks and financial supervisory 
authorities to take action against any financial institution that fails to comply, and allow 
national supervisors to impose penalties either to restrain discovered breaches of the 
new rules or to remedy their causes. 
 
Significantly, central to the directive’s measures are ‘malus’ - the adjustment of an 
award of variable remuneration before it has vested - ‘clawback’ - the return of money 
already paid to employees under certain conditions – ‘bonus caps’ – capping the bonus 
payments of senior staff in financial institutions - and last but not least ‘remuneration 
disclosure’ - the level of disclosure needed by shareholders regarding details of 
directors’ remuneration and the extent to which shareholder approval is needed. In 
looking at these measures in more detail, unless otherwise specified up to 100% of 
variable pay must be subject to malus or clawback arrangements, a particularly useful 
tool where the employee took part or was responsible for conduct resulting in 
significant losses to his/her institution or failed to adhere to the appropriate standards 
of fitness and propriety. In addition, bankers’ bonuses are to be capped; the maximum 
payout is set at a years’ salary, and this can increase to two years' salary with 
shareholder approval.8 In other words, provided two thirds of shareholders approve, 
                                                 
6 (575/2013) (CRR). 
7 Basel III is an overhaul of banking rules and the biggest shake-up of the banking 
system since the global financial crisis. Before its implementation, the lack of solid 
financial cushions meant that many banks were at risk, requiring taxpayer-funded 
bailouts to avoid collapse. Basel III focuses on a ratio of high-quality capital - called 
tier 1, which is needed to protect it against any future shocks. The high-quality capital 
will increase to 9% after the rules come into effect: Commission Recommendations 
2004/913/EC, 2005/162/EC, 2009/385/EC, (2013/36/EU) (CRD) 
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:120:0028:0031:E
N:PDF accessed 20 February 2016.  
8 The agreement is on a mandatory 1:1 ratio on salary relative to variable pay, which 
can rise to 2:1 with explicit shareholder approval.  
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bonuses for regulated staff are capped at 200% of salary; in the absence of such an 
agreement bonuses are capped at 100% of salary. The other area of executive 
remuneration addressed by the EU is disclosure of directors' remuneration: a European 
Shareholder Rights Directive (2007/36/EC) and new EU rules extend shareholders’ 
right to vote under the ‘say on pay’ provisions.9  
  
Britain derives its rules on executive pay from domestic as well as EU legislation. 10 
Matters related to executive remuneration were first given attention in 1995 following 
a period of public dissatisfaction on the levels of directors’ pay. The result was the 
Greenbury Code Directors’ Remuneration, Report of a Study Group, 11  which 
recommended establishing remuneration committees of non-executive directors to 
decide on levels of remuneration and on particular pay packages. The aim was to 
introduce an element of independence in deciding the level of the executive’s pay. The 
report’s recommendations were later incorporated into the UK Listing Rules and 
the UK Corporate Governance Code (2012).12 Crucially, the last few years have seen 
an explosion of reforms to the regulation of the UK’s financial industries, including 
reforms to the remuneration and bonuses rewarded to executives of large financial 
institutions. These reforms were heavily influenced by the EU; it is EU initiatives that 
have affected the domestic requirements (such as the clawback and malus provisions) 
of the UK Corporate Governance Code and the Investment Association’s principles of 
remuneration. The current UK Remuneration Codes13 derive much of their present 
form from European legislative packages and regulations, particularly CRD IV, and the 
practical details of CRD IV are set out in the revised SYSC Remuneration Code.14 
Importantly also, all UK banks and building societies (and some investment firms), are 
subject to the requirements of the European Directive.  
 
                                                 
9 The new EU rules extend shareholders’ right to vote under the ‘say on pay’ 
provisions are to be found in Directive (EU) 2017/828 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 17 May 2017, amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the 
encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement.   
10 There are currently over 100,000 items of UK legislation in the UK which have 
their origins in EU Treaties. It is not clear whether these pieces of legislation will 
remain as they are, repealed or come to an end as a result of Brexit. What happens 
next is a question the UK Parliament will inevitably face in the years to come.  
11 Chaired by Sir Richard Greenbury (1995). 
12 UK Corporate Governance Code (2012), section D. 
13 There are five Remuneration Codes in the UK tailored to different types of firm: 
SYSC 19A – IFPRU Remuneration Code; SYSC 19B – AIFM Remuneration Code; 
SYSC 19C – BIPRU Remuneration Code; SYSC 19D – Dual-regulated firms 
Remuneration Code; SYSC 19E – UCITS Remuneration Code. The Codes apply to 
more than 3,000 firms, including banks, building societies, large full-scope UK 
alternative investment fund managers, Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) 
investment firms such as broker-dealers, investment managers, corporate finance, 
private equity and venture capital firms and operators of multilateral trading facilities 
and management companies of undertakings in collective investments in transferrable 
securities. 
14 In recent years, we have seen the implementation of CRD III and IV, AIFMD, 
UCITSv and Solvency II, all of which encompass regulation linked to remuneration. 
These rules that have already been implemented in UK regulation.  
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And yet, the future of many of the aforementioned areas remains uncertain following 
Brexit. Uncertainty is not a welcome prospect; the health of the UK economy largely 
depends on the design of its financial services industry, an industry that accounts for 
approximately 8% of UK GDP. In this regard, in the short-to-medium term nothing will 
change. Still, what happens next matters greatly. Following the country’s notice of its 
exit, a transitional period will follow, during which the UK’s future relationship with 
the EU will be negotiated. Where EU law has been incorporated into primary UK 
legislation no change will happen. But under the terms of the European Communities 
Act 1972, EU law can take the form of secondary legislation; such secondary legislation 
can fall away unless deliberately retained. According to a detailed briefing published 
by the House of Commons Library concerning the process for the UK leaving the EU, 
there are provisions of the CRD IV that do not derive from Basel III proposals but rather 
from EU’s own policy; amongst these are those relating to corporate governance and 
remuneration. Upon Brexit, the UK will be free to rid itself of any unwanted provisions 
without deviating from the Basel III requirements. This means that the aforesaid 
European-inspired steps, solid as they are, might not survive the Brexit currents; some 
parts of EU regulation could be altered or scrapped altogether.  
 
The following section will examine three key areas of the UK corporate governance 
framework that are derived directly from EU initiatives, namely clawback, caps on 
bonuses and remuneration disclosure, and will consider whether their post-Brexit 
‘evaporation’ is at all, likely.15  
 
2.1 Brexit and its Impact on ‘Clawback’ 
 
A clawback provision is a special contractual clause by which money already paid to 
employees must be paid back under certain conditions. Put simply, clawback makes 
someone give something back. In the employment context, it is triggered when an 
employer claims repayment of remuneration which has already been paid to an 
employee upon the happening of specified circumstances. In practice, this normally 
relates to the repayment of cash, stock or other assets already awarded to an employee. 
                                                 
15 For an excellent discussion on the remuneration policies in the EU, see Ellis Ferran, 
“Crisis-driven Regulatory Reform: Where in the World is the EU Going?”, in E. 
Ferran, N. Moloney, J.G. Hill, J.C. Coffee, Jr (eds), The Regulatory Aftermath of the 
Global Financial Crisis (Cambridge University Press 2012); Guido Ferrarini, Niamh 
Moloney, ‘Executive Remuneration in the EU: The Context For Reform’, 2005 21 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy 304; For an in-depth evaluation, see T. Boeri, C. 
Lucifora, K.J. Murphy (eds), Executive Remuneration and Employee Performance-
Related Pay - A Transatlantic Perspective (Oxford University Press 2013), 92. For a 
more general discussion, see Jaap Winter, ‘Corporate Governance Going Astray: 
Executive Remuneration Built to Fail’, in R.S. Thomas, J.G. Hill (eds), Research 
Handbook on Executive Pay, (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd 2010); D. Arsalidou, 
‘Rethinking Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions’ (Routledge, 2015). For a 
thorough discussion of executive remuneration in the UK and its theoretical 
underpinnings, see M. Petrin, ‘Executive Compensation in the United Kingdom – 
Past, Present, and Future’ (2015) 36(7) The Company Lawyer 196; D. Arsalidou, ‘The 
Regulation of Executive Pay and Economic Theory (2011) 5 Journal of Business Law 
431. 
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An invaluable tool, it permits firms to instruct executives to return their bonuses under 
the presence of specific conditions. Bonuses are normally given annually in cash, and 
frequently in the City of London big parts of bonuses are paid under a different type of 
arrangement, commonly referred to as the ‘deferred incentive plan’. It is these deferred 
incentive plans that, in practice, are being clawed back. What this means is that 
performance is measured over a period of time with the bonus being delayed 
accordingly, thereby granting the employee an incentive to perform well within a 
specific role. Where a bonus is paid on the basis of performance which subsequently 
turns out to have been miscalculated, it can be clawed back: this happened recently 
when directors of Lloyds Bank were asked to return large parts of their bonuses as a 
result of the bank’s decision to pay compensation in excess of £3.2 billion to customers 
who were wrongly sold Payment Protection Insurance.16 
 
In the revised UK Corporate Governance Code of 2014, a significant amendment was 
introduced by the Financial Reporting Council: firms are now required to include 
provisions enabling performance adjustment or post-vesting clawback for the variable 
pay of executive directors (including bonuses and long-term incentives). Firms must 
also include details of the exact circumstances that entitle remuneration committees to 
act, should they deem necessary. This marks a crucial change from the wording of the 
previous Corporate Governance Code, that granted remuneration committees the power 
to act “in exceptional circumstances of misstatement or misconduct”. Now, it is up to 
individual companies to determine the circumstances that would justify interference by 
their remuneration committees. As a consequence, many companies will need to 
strengthen their policies. Even though the majority of companies already have measures 
in place concerning the clawback of pay under specified conditions, not many include 
provisions regarding the clawing back of payments already granted. With the 
toughening-up of the clawback rules, firms are required to define their policies in 
relation to issues such as the precise circumstances that would provoke clawback, the 
time-limit of the clawback risk and how variable deferred pay should be designed in 
order to ensure that sums are withheld or recovered. Crucially also, the Prudential 
Regulatory Authority (PRA) has recently issued a final policy statement on bonus 
clawback, together with an instrument making various changes to the Remuneration 
Code. With effect from 1 January 2015, PRA-authorised firms are required to amend 
their employment contracts to ensure that bonuses which have already been paid to their 
employees, can be clawed back where necessary.17 In particular, they are required to 
                                                 
16 Attracta Mooney, ‘UK Fund Executives’ Pay Slashed: Brexit, Fund Outflows and 
Declining Profitability Put Pressure on Remuneration in 2016’ Financial Times 
(London, 9 April 2017) 8. 
17 The Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), created as a part of the Bank of England 
by the Financial Services Act (2012), is responsible for the prudential regulation and 
supervision of around 1,700 banks, building societies, credit unions, insurers and major 
investment firms. The objectives of the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) are set 
out in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA). It has three statutory 
objectives: 
1. a general objective to promote the safety and soundness of the firms it regulates; 
2. an objective specific to insurance firms, to contribute to the securing of an 
appropriate degree of protection for those who are or may become insurance 
policyholders; and  
3. a secondary objective to facilitate effective competition. 
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clawback bonuses where there is evidence of employee misbehavior, where the firm or 
relevant business unit suffers a material downturn in its financial performance or where 
the firm or relevant business unit suffers a material failure of risk management. In 
addition, firms must set the specific criteria for the application of malus and clawback, 
and must also ensure that the criteria for the application of malus and clawback include 
instances where the employee took part in or was responsible for conduct which 
resulted in significant losses to the firm, or behaved in a way which failed to meet the 
appropriate standards of fitness and propriety.18 
 
There remain a number of pending questions, particularly in relation to the scope and 
enforceability of clawback provisions. Also, there are outstanding technical matters, 
such as how non-cash bonus awards are valued or whether clawback applies to the gross 
or net value of bonus awards. There are a number of sensitive issues too, such as which 
firms should be entitled to retrieve bonuses, as well as some controversial questions, 
such as the exact circumstances that should entitle firms to retrieve vested and paid 
bonuses, especially in relation to those granted seven to ten years earlier. 
Unsurprisingly therefore, there has been some opposition to use of clawback as an 
effective governance tool; for instance, the British Bankers' Association challenged this 
practice primarily on the grounds that it is unfair and potentially unenforceable. It 
suggested that introducing changes to employment contracts retrospectively, violates 
employment law in countries where UK banks function and operate. It also claimed 
that such a policy can destroy results-based pay, causing an increase in the overall pay 
awarded to executive directors.19  
 
Still, there has not been much opposition to clawback, especially compared to numerous 
other corporate governance measures and initiatives. In fact, despite the controversies 
and outstanding technical questions, clawback provisions are now well embedded 
within the UK corporate governance ethos; the UK Corporate Governance Code firmly 
incorporates the requirement for malus and clawback in relation to executive variable 
pay (particularly bonuses and share plans) for all UK listed companies. Crucially, there 
is a high compliance level with the principles of the Code, and within this high level 
clawback clearly stands out. According to a 2017 survey examining the compliance of 
UK-based banks with the corporate governance principles, the majority of FTSE 350 
have implemented a rule that companies must adopt the necessary arrangements to 
permit them to recover or withhold variable pay. The figures paint a positive picture 
here: 91% have already adopted a clawback provision that is linked to the annual 
bonuses awarded to executives, and 78% have adopted a clawback provision linked to 
their long-term plans.20  
                                                 
18 Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) rule 15.21. 
19  ‘BBA response to Prudential Regulation Authority consultation on Clawback 
CP6/14’ <https://www.BritishBankers'Association+clawback> accessed 06 July 2017.  
20  Corporate Governance Review < https://www.grantthornton.co.uk/globalassets/1.-
member-firms/united-kingdom/pdf/publication/corporate-governance-review-
2017.pdf > accessed 03 July 2017. The review includes a comprehensive analysis of 
the annual reports of the companies in the FTSE 350, and covers 305 FTSE 350 
companies. Amongst other matters, it assesses compliance with the disclosure 
requirements of the UK Corporate Governance Code 2016 (and 2014 where 
applicable), considers the quality and detail of explanations, and draws attention to best 
practice and emerging trends in narrative reporting.  
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All in all, amongst the many measures adopted by the FRC to transform the bonus and 
excessive pay culture of the UK, clawback plays a crucial part.21 In fact, there is clear 
enthusiasm to improve and move forward with this provision, as shown by the fact that 
the FCA, in a bid to combat misconduct, is considering mirroring the PRA's clawback 
scheme with respect to FCA-regulated firms and also extending clawback to bankers' 
basic salaries (as opposed to solely bonuses).22 Designed properly, this practice can act 
as an imperative device for corporate accountability. The appetite here is for 
strengthening rather than weeding out the clawback provision.23 
 
2.2. Brexit and Its Impact on ‘Caps on Bonuses’ 
 
Perhaps the most high-profile of Europe’s laws and regulations is the cap on bonuses.24 
Adopted in 2014, the cap limits bonuses to 100% of salary, or 200% with shareholder 
approval. This marks a momentous change; previously there was no legal pay limit on 
bank executives, who could earn performance bonuses many times their base salaries. 
The cap on bonuses is a direct result of the strong public frustration that has grown 
across Europe over excessive pay rewards: excessive bonuses, many endlessly argue, 
encourage executives to care very little about the long-term future of their institutions.25 
                                                 
21 Others would include boardroom diversity and the disclosure of long-term viability 
statements. 
22 As Wheatley explains, this is primarily so due to that there is a tendency for 
employers to pay their employees higher basic salaries - a direct consequence of the 
CRD IV bonus cap. PRA-authorised firms must now ensure that bonuses are subject 
to clawback for a period of up to seven years after vesting. However, this change does 
not have retrospective effect: it applies only to bonuses awarded on or after 1 January 
2015. Moreover, firms will not have to clawback bonuses where there is a material 
downturn in financial performance, but they will where either (i) there is reasonable 
evidence of employee misbehaviour or material error, or (ii) the firm or relevant 
business unit suffers a material failure of risk management: Martin Wheatley, ‘FCA 
Issue Rules and Guidance on Bankers Remuneration and Clawback Obligations’ 
<https://www.kingsleynapley.co.uk/comment/blogs/employment-law-blog/fca-issue-
rules-and-guidance-on-bankers-remuneration-and-clawback-obligations> (Kingsley 
Napley, 10 July 2017) accessed 20 June 2017. 
23 Another indicator that there is appetite for strengthening the provisions lies in a 
new proposal by the FCA and PRA that firms should be entitled to extend the 
clawback period for senior managers for up to 10 years in the event of an internal or 
regulatory investigation. 
24 For a detailed evaluation of the ‘problematic’ nature of the bonus cap, see K. Asai, 
‘Is Capping Executive Bonuses Useful?’ (2016) WP/16/196 IMF Working Paper, 
Monetary and Capital Markets 2; A, Kleymenova, I. Tuna, ‘Regulation of 
Compensation’ (2017) WP 16/07 The University of Chicago Booth School of Business 
1. Also see ‘Cap and flayed – Europe looks set to limit bank bonuses’ The Economist 
(London, 23 February 2013) 13; Jane DeAnne, ‘The Future of Executive Pay’ 
Financial Times (London, 3 August 2012) 5. 
25 For instance, according to a research study examining the effects of bonuses in 67 
European banks, excessive financial sector bonuses caused banks to earn more in the 
short term but led to unsustainable risks that eventually materialised in the financial 
crisis: Matthias Efing, Harald Hau, Patrick Kampkötter and Johannes Steinbrecher, 
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Indeed, for many in Europe, bankers, and especially Anglo-Saxon bankers, are 
inherently gluttonous, careless and self-seeking. There is a general perception that there 
exists a system of rewards that encourages excessive risk-taking and short-sighted 
behaviour with little regard to the damaging effects of short-term actions. The idea 
therefore is that the cap can help suppress these undesirable behavioural traits; it can 
discourage excessive risk-taking whilst motivating executives to think carefully and 
prudently about the long-term prospects and profitability of their institutions.  
 
Nevertheless, the UK banking industry has not been too supportive of the idea of 
imposing a cap on bonuses; for instance, the Head of Trading at ETX Capital in London 
argued that as a result of the cap, banks risk losing their top talent. 26 Most crucially, 
the UK government made a formidable attempt to oppose its implementation; it argued 
that it would be relatively easy to find ways around the restrictions, and that in limiting 
bonuses banks will either raise salaries or come up with alternative ways to pay their 
executives. 27  Caps on bonuses can easily backfire, driving up fixed salaries to 
compensate. Firms that are not obligated to stay within the European Union will be 
incentivised to leave, and when banks invest in future divisions, the investments will 
be based outside the EU; it is therefore important, the government said, that any new 
regulation is flexible enough to permit banks to compete and prosper whilst based in 
the UK.  
 
Eventually Britain had to conform to the established position once statute passed. 
Notwithstanding the various challenges from London, the UK failed to garner enough 
support to prevent legislation on the issue. In fact, the bonus cap has been in effect since 
January 2014. Still, there continues to be plenty of scepticism to this policy within the 
UK. This is hardly surprising, particularly since the UK hosts Europe's biggest financial 
services centre.28 Nevertheless, London’s position is threatened by the imminent move 
of Morgan Stanley to Frankfurt after Brexit. Other banks such as Golden Sachs, 
Standard Chartered, Daiwa, Sumitomo Mitsui, Nomura of Japan, VTB of Russia and 
                                                 
‘Incentive Pay and Bank Risk-Taking: Evidence from Austrian, German, and Swiss 
Banks’ 
<https://www.eeassoc.org/doc/upload/BANK_BONUSES_ENCOURAGED_EXCES
SIVE_RISK-TAKING-
_New_evidence_from_the_Austrian,_German_and_Swiss_financial_sectors20150822
215351.pdf> accessed 18 September 2017.  
26 As stated by Joe Rundle, the Head of Trading at ETX Capital in London: 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-21621045> accessed 10 May 2016.  
27 George Osborne, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, lodged a complaint in the 
European Court of Justice in 2013, arguing that the EU banker bonus cap is 
misconceived but conceded defeat a year later when he abandoned the legal challenge 
to overturn the cap: Court of Justice of the European Union No 154/14, 20 November 
2014 <https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2014-
11/cp140154en.pdf> accessed 10 June 2017.  
28 The UK is home to approximately 78% of European capital markets and investment 
banking revenue. Out of this 78%, 55% originate from the EU27 countries. The UK 
also holds 37% of Europe’s assets under management, followed by France (20%) and 
Germany (10%): see Association for Financial Markets in Europe, ‘Implementing 
Brexit Practical challenges for wholesale banking in adapting to the new 
environment’, <www.afme.eu> accessed 30 August 2017. 
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Woori Bank of South Korea will expand their Frankfurt offices. Brussels, Dublin and 
Paris are also vying for a share of London’s banking sector.29 The bonus restrictions 
can, in the long run at least, cost jobs in the City, pushing financial institutions to 
establish themselves in more favourable countries. A self-defeating policy such as this 
would see the City of London's overseas rivals exploiting this opportunity for their 
benefit, undermining EU’s support in Britain.30 Certainly, from the perspective of the 
cap’s opponents (such as the UK banking industry and the FSA), this is a good time for 
Britain; the UK’s exit from the European Union could mean that UK-based banks can 
be freed from the Union’s heavy and unnecessary restrictions on bonuses. Through 
Brexit, Britain can reinforce its position within the global financial markets, expanding 
its global footprint without the need to conform to unnecessary and restrictive EU rules. 
 
The UK might decide to abandon the cap, as the case may be; this could be viewed as 
Britain’s golden opportunity to rid itself of a measure that it has always strongly 
opposed. Those in financial occupations in London and elsewhere will be pleased with 
this prospect; many consider Brussels to be incorrigibly antagonistic to free markets, 
oblivious as to how accomplishment is actually attained within them. By abandoning 
the cap Britain will highlight the fact that there is a fine line between pleasing the 
crowds and chasing business out of town. 31 Freedom from the cap can make Britain 
more competitive, particularly as against other large financial markets, such as the US, 
that have not followed suit. This is evidently very crucial; according to a study 
conducted by the Bank of England in 2015, since 2013 bonuses have climbed relatively 
higher in the US than those in London.32  The study also underlines the fact that 
numerous large international banks, such as HSBC and Barclays, are displeased with 
the cap because of its application to employees more widely (provided a bank has its 
base in the EU). This makes it more difficult for them to employ and hold on to high-
level employees in competitive cities like New York. 33  There is yet another, and 
perhaps more compelling reason here: the cap does not appear to function as originally 
intended. According to the aforementioned Bank of England study (interestingly 
conducted a year after the cap was implemented), because of the bonus cap there has 
been a growth in fixed remuneration as a proportion of total remuneration. In other 
words, the cap has resulted in bankers’ salaries rising as a result of firms refusing to cut 
pay – at present fixed pay makes up more than 50pc of high-level bankers’ overall pay, 
                                                 
29 J. Rankin, ‘Banks and companies plan expansion in Frankfurt after Brexit’ The 
Guardian, 21st July 2017 < https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/jul/21/banks-
and-companies-plan-expansion-in-frankfurt-after-brexit> accessed 30 August 2017 
30 Demetra Arsalidou, ‘Rethinking Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions’ 
(Routledge, 2015). 
31 Noted by a senior investment bank executive in an interview with the Economist 
magazine: ‘Cap and flayed – Europe looks Set to Limit Bank Bonuses’ The 
Economist (London, 23 February 2013) 13. 
32 Bank of England Research (2015) Q4 55 4 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/2015/q4.
pdf> accessed 10 May 2017. 
33 Bank of England Research (2015) Q4 55 4 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/2015/q4.
pdf> accessed 10 May 2017. 
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up from less than 10pc in 2010.34 These are the unintended and most detrimental effects 
to this measure. 
 
Yet still, given the present political climate, the government might prefer to retain this 
EU measure. Even if one accepts the economic argument for scrapping the cap, the 
current political ambiance undermines the impetus for doing so. The continued 
uncertainty surrounding Brexit is likely to reduce the urgency to add more ambiguity 
into the mix. Popular sentiment, political pressure and general appearances will matter 
greatly in this debate. Britain is currently susceptible to systemic uncertainty emerging 
from Brexit; this is not the time to appear to soften the existing regime. Rather, the 
government might prefer to retain its present system, a system that appears to adopt a 
consistent approach to pay within the European continent, and that in turn plays its part 
in securing some confidence within the domestic and international contexts.35 In fact, 
the increasing public disarray over Brexit36 might even result in the remuneration levels 
decreasing – not because of the legal consequences of Britain leaving but due to 
pressure upon industry and government to take prudent decisions within prominent and 
controversial fields, executive remuneration being a key field here.37 Otherwise we may 
see London salaries as well as bonuses rising if elements of CRD IV, the European 
Union’s banking remuneration regulations, are repealed, an alternative that the UK 
government would undoubtedly wish to avoid.  
                                                 
34 Bank of England Research (2015) Q4 55 4 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/2015/q4.
pdf> accessed 10 May 2017.  
35 For an interesting discussion on this issue, see: Niamh Moloney, “The EU and 
Executive Pay: Managing Harmonization Risks”, in R.S. Thomas, J.G. Hill (eds), 
Research Handbook on Executive Pay (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd 2010) 466. 
36 An increasing number of people think that voting to leave the European Union was 
not a good idea, according to a new poll. The YouGov poll, conducted for The Times 
newspaper in 2017, shows the highest proportion of people regretting the result since 
the referendum in June 2016, with 47 per cent of respondents suggesting that the UK 
should not have voted Leave compared with 42 per cent who think it was the right 
decision: YouGov Poll 
<https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/cbirgnop2j/YG%
20Trackers%20-%20EU%20Tracker%20Questions_W.pdf> accessed 07 November 
2017. 
37 As noted in the Financial Times, the chief executives of Britain’s largest listed fund 
houses saw their pay cut substantially after the Brexit vote in 2016. This is possibly a 
result of declining profitability and investor outflows that placed significant pressure 
on executive pay packages. For example, in 2016 the total amount paid to the chief 
executives of Jupiter, Ashmore, Aberdeen, Henderson and Intermediate Capital 
Group decreased by between 10 and 65 per cent, as a result of significant cuts in 
bonuses. A strong factor contributing to this is the significant market chaos that 
followed the Brexit vote as well as the election of Donald Trump as US president in 
November 2016. This resulted in low profitability levels, that were actually lower 
than those in 2015. Consequently, there has been a lot of pressure on pay and 
executive bonuses in the past year or so, pressure that is likely to go on for longer: 
Attracta Mooney, ‘UK Fund Executives’ Pay Slashed: Brexit, Fund Outflows and 
Declining Profitability Put Pressure on Remuneration in 2016’ Financial Times 
(London, 9 April 2017) 8. 
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2.3 Brexit and Disclosure of Directors’ Remuneration 
 
Disclosure of information is said to address corporate governance weaknesses such as 
information asymmetry and promoting shareholders’ voices.38 It should be made clear 
at this point that one of the perceived weaknesses in current corporate governance 
practice, i.e. the causal link between high pay disparities and company performance, is 
not yet proven. The hypothesis that high pay disparities harm company performance 
has been debated on both sides by respected academics, scholars and organisations such 
as the Trade Union Congress and the High Pay Centre. The first step is to analyse 
whether executive pay is too high. The second step is to prove the causal link between 
high pay disparities and company performance. The evidence for both is inconclusive 
to date. A range of factors can influence company performance and executive 
remuneration is only one of them.  
 
In banking, profitability is even more complex with some banks operating in different 
jurisdictions and markets. Return on equity, the level of interest rates, bank 
concentration and government ownership are some of the factors that may influence 
banks’ profitability.39 Research into the profitability of banks in the EU has only been 
recent. This is unusual given that the EU accounts for approximately 25% of global 
GDP. It also has a sophisticated wholesale financial services sector, which generates 
over 30% of the world’s wholesale financial services activity.40 Earlier studies by Berg 
et al41, Pastor et al42, Lang and Welzel,43 Lozano-Vivas,44 Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas45 
focus mainly on a small range of banks in Norway, Sweden, Finland, France, Germany 
                                                 
38 Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Committee, Corporate Governance, 
Third Report of Session (HC 2016–17, Ch 2) 
39 P. Molyneux and J. Thorton ‘Determinants of European Bank Profitability’ (1992) 
16(6) J. Bank. Finance 173 
40 Association for Financial Markets in Europe, (n 29) 
41 S. Berg, F. Forsund, L. Hjalmarsson and M. Suominen ‘Bank Efficiency in the 
Nordic Countries’ (1993) 17 J. Bank. Finance 371 
42 J. Pastor, F. Perez and J. Quesada ‘Efficiency Analysis in Banking Firms: An 
International Comparison. Working Paper EC’ (1995) 95-18. Instituto Valenciano de 
Investigaciones Economicas, Valencia. 
43 G. Lang and P. Welzel ‘Efficiency and Technical Progress in Banking: Empirical 
Results for a Panel of German Banks’ (1996) 20 J. Bank. Finance 1003 
44 A. Lozano-Vivas ‘Profit Efficiency for Spanish Savings Banks’ (1997) 98 Eur. J. 
Oper. Res 381 
45 M. Dietsch and A. Lozano-Vivas ‘How the Environment determines Banking 
Efficiency: A Comparison between French and Spanish Industries’ (2000) 24 J. Bank. 
Finance 985 
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and Spain. Later research by Altunbas et al,46 Bikker,47 Maudos et al,48 and Schure et 
al49 cover a broader spectrum of EU banks.  
 
Three recent scholarly papers50 have been cited regularly to support the argument that 
general executive pay is too high and unrelated to company performance.51 A critical 
analysis of these papers will reveal that there are limitations with these studies. The 
common weakness is that all three papers do not take into account of equity incentives. 
The paper by Cooper et al52 is not about equity incentives but total pay (which includes 
salary and bonus). The papers by Philip53, Florackis & Balafas54 only researched into 
newly granted shares and options. Yet, directors are usually incentivised by shares 
which have been granted. Further, the three studies do not take into account of company 
size or establish the causal link.55 
 
In the UK, academics are inconclusive on whether executive remuneration led to 
distortion of incentives or whether there was too much emphasis on short-termism. 
Gregg, Jewell et al56 analysed the pay in the UK financial industry. They concluded 
that whilst pay is high in financial organisations, the cash-plus-bonus pay-performance 
sensitivity of financial firms is not significantly higher compared to other industries. 
Their results showed that RBS had the highest total compensation in 2000 amongst the 
big four UK banks. By 2006 however, Barclays had the highest total compensation. 
Gregg, Jewell et al are not convinced that the incentive structure in bankers’ pay led to 
                                                 
46 Y. Altunbas, E.P.M. Gardener, P. Molyneux and B. Moore ‘Efficiency in European 
Banking’ (2001) 45 Eur. Econ. Rev 1931 
47 J. Bikker ‘Efficiency and Cost Differences across Countries in a Unified European 
Banking Market’ (2002) DNB Staff Reports No. 87. De Nederlandsche Bank 
48 J. Maudos, J.M. Pastor, F. Perez and J. Quesada ‘Cost and Profit Efficiency in 
European Banks’ (2002) 12 J. Int. Finance. Markets Inst. Money 33 
49 P. Schure, R. Wagenvoort and D. O’Brien ‘The Efficiency and the Conduct of 
European Banks: Developments after 1992’ (2004) 13 Rev. Finance. Econ 371 
50 C. Philip ‘Restoring Responsible Ownership – Ending the Ownerless Corporation 
and Controlling Executive Pay’ High Pay Centre, September 2016; M. J. Cooper, G. 
Huseyin and R. P. Raghavendra ‘Performance for Pay? The Relation Between CEO 
Incentive Compensation and Future Stock Price Performance’ (2016) Unpublished 
working paper; C. Florackis and N. Balafas ‘CEO Compensation and the Future 
Shareholder Returns: Evidence from the London Stock Exchange’ (2014) 27 Journal 
of Empirical Finance 97 
51 A. Edmans in Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Committee, 
Corporate Governance, Third Report of Session (HC 2016–17, Ch 2) 
52 M. J. Cooper, G. Huseyin and R. P. Raghavendra ‘Performance for Pay? The 
Relation Between CEO Incentive Compensation and Future Stock Price Performance’ 
(2016) Unpublished Working Paper 
53 C. Philip ‘Restoring Responsible Ownership – Ending the Ownerless Corporation 
and Controlling Executive Pay’ High Pay Centre, September 2016 
54 C. Florackis and N. Balafas ‘CEO Compensation and the Future Shareholder 
Returns: Evidence from the London Stock Exchange’ (2014) 27 Journal of Empirical 
Finance 97 
55 Edmans (n 51) 
56 P. Gregg, S. Jewell and I. Tonks ‘Executive Pay and Performance: Did Bankers’ 
Bonuses Cause the Crisis?’ (2012) 12(1) International Review of Finance 89 
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excessive risk-taking. One must note however, that their results did not include equity 
incentive payments. In the UK, Sir David Walker57 criticised the role of non-equity 
incentive payments for not relating to long-term profitability. Perhaps this explains the 
focus on cash bonus in Gregg, Jewell et al’s study.  
 
One then wonders why both the EU and the UK regulations (Shareholder Rights 
Directive (2007/36/EC); CRD IV; The Large and Medium-sized Companies and 
Groups (Accounts and Reports) (Amendment) Regulations 2013 and the Companies 
Act 2006 ask for disclosure of directors’ remuneration if the above causal link is 
inconclusive to date. The authors submit three reasons why disclosure of directors’ 
remuneration are important to good corporate governance. First, public trust in 
companies, especially banks, was eroded after the financial crisis of 2007-2009. 
Although the bashing of bankers and public outcry against bankers’ remuneration have 
died down, the UK has one of the lowest trust levels in businesses in the Global 28 
countries. Public trust in businesses in the UK is 45% in 2017.58 As a comparison, the 
United States has a 58% trust rate; France has a 50% trust rate, Spain just pipped the 
UK with a 46% trust rate and Germany has 43% trust rate.59 The UK’s trust rate has 
slipped 1% compared to 2016. The general weak score can be explained by the public’s 
dissatisfaction towards unfairness in executive remuneration and the tax arrangements 
of certain global companies.60 Additionally, recent corporate scandals at BHS, Sports 
Direct, Tesco, Rolls Royce and BAE Systems further weakened the public’s trust in 
companies. The perception of corporate entities and the unfairness felt by the public are 
important, especially with the uncertainty of Brexit looming over workers.61 The truth 
is that the current political climate calls for social, responsible, stakeholder-led 
corporate governance in our society. Executive pay represents a very small proportion 
of expenditure for large companies (an estimated 0.6% in the FTSE 100 companies).62 
Corporate boards have the difficult task of balancing the value added by directors 
against public sentiment and the overall values of the company. 
 
The second reason why disclosure of directors’ remuneration matters is because 
London’s appeal as an international financial hub faces stiff competition from other 
European financial centres, which enjoy the single passporting scheme. In total, there 
are nine passporting rights covering a range of financial services. Each passporting right 
derives from a EU directive or regulation. For example, a UK-based bank might use a 
CRD IV passport to provide corporate advisory services, lending or deposit services to 
a business in another EU state. Banks established in the European Union or European 
Economic Area (EEA) can establish branches in other EEA countries or provide 
financial services across the EEA without the need for further authorisation. Brexit 
transforms British banks into third-country banks. Brexit creates significant hurdles to 
banks in the EU and EEA when providing financial services in the EU since they lose 
the single passport advantages. 
 
                                                 
57 D. Walker. A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other Financial 
Industry Entities (2009) Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London 
58 Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Committee (n 39) 
59 Ibid (n 30) Ch 2 
60 Edelman Trust Barometer 2017, CIPD Pulse Survey, December 2015. 
61 Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Committee (n 39) 
62 Edmans (n 51) 
16 
 
The alternative of obtaining a licence in each EU country is time-consuming and full 
of uncertainties. Not all EU countries provide licences. The scope of financial services 
operating under licences is limited and generally do not carry rights to onward cross-
border trade from the country of licensing.63 The licence regime is subject to the caveat 
that Britain’s regulatory regime is accepted by the EU as ‘equivalent’ to the EU 
standards. It can be argued that as long as Britain sustain its current standards under the 
current range of EU directives and regulations, the ‘equivalence’ regime should apply.  
The reality is that there are three problems. First, a declaration of ‘equivalence’ can be 
revoked within 30 days. A declaration can be full or partial as well as subject to a time 
limit. Besides, there is no defined period as to when the European Commission must 
provide a decision when assessing ‘equivalence’.64 It took the European Commission 
four years to decide whether central clearing counter-parties in the United States are 
equivalent.65 This uncertainty does not assist banks in planning for the long-term. 
Secondly, the ‘equivalence’ regime is not available in certain core banking activities 
such as lending, deposit-taking, credit cards and payments. Finally, and most 
importantly, there is no agreed definition of ‘equivalence’ as yet. This is still subject to 
an agreement between the EU and Britain. Much depends on how much control the EU 
wishes to retain over Britain’s regulatory developments and Britain’s ability to break 
free of particularly onerous provisions.66  
 
Finally, disclosure of directors’ remuneration is important because shareholders’ ability 
to express dissatisfaction or veto executive remuneration is weak in the UK. 
Shareholders of public companies in the UK have the right to vote on advisory  
resolutions about executive compensation. The ‘Say on Pay’ vote was introduced by 
the UK government to increase ‘accountability, transparency, and performance linkage’ 
of executive pay.67 The advisory nature of such votes means that they are mainly 
symbolic. Indeed, Ferri & Maber 68  demonstrated that the advisory resolutions on 
executive compensation had no effect on the level and growth of CEO pay. They 
examined the effect of the say on pay legislation in a large sample of UK firms by 
comparing the determinants of CEO pay before (2000-2002) and after (2003-2005) its 
introduction. Nevertheless, their research revealed that there was heightened sensitivity 
towards poor performance, particularly in companies where they had very high 
remuneration. The Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 introduced a binding 
                                                 
63 British Bankers’ Association ‘What is ‘passporting’ and why does it matter?’ 
(2016) BBA Brexit Brief #3 <https://www.bba.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/12/webversion-BQB-3-1.pdf> accessed 31 August 2017 
64 Directorate-General for  Internal Policies ‘Third-country equivalence in EU 
Banking Legislation’ (2016) Economic Governance Support Unit < 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/587369/IPOL_BRI(2016)
587369_EN.pdf> accessed 31 August 2017 
65 Ibid (n 65) 
66 J. Ford ‘Financial future after Brexit: passporting v equivalence’ (2017) Financial 
Times <https://www.ft.com/content/61221dd4-d8c4-11e6-944b-e7eb37a6aa8e> 
accessed 31 August 2017 
67 J. Baird and P. Stowasser. ‘Executive Compensation Disclosure Requirements: The 
German, UK and US Approaches’ PracticalLaw.com, PLC Document 4-101-7960, 
September 23, 2002. 
68 F. Ferri and D. Maber ‘Say on Pay Vote and CEO Compensation: Evidence from 
the UK’ (2013) Review of Finance 527 
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vote on ‘Say on Pay’ to shareholders of quoted companies, but this is only available 
every three years in the UK. Using a large sample of binding and advisory votes in UK 
companies, Gregory-Smith & Mai69 demonstrates that even with a binding vote, it is 
unlikely that shareholder dissent will lead to a reduction in executive pay. The binding 
votes relate to the election of directors, both executive and non-executive and the 
approval of long-term equity-based incentive schemes. The advisory vote relates to the 
annual advisory vote on the Directors’ Remuneration Report. Their results show that 
shareholders tend not to use binding votes to express disapproval of executive pay 
levels beyond the amounts merited by firm performance. Recent research by Correa et 
al70 refutes this. Their research in both binding and advisory ‘Say on Pay’ laws in 
twelve countries are associated with lower executive pay levels, only advisory ‘Say on 
Pay’ laws tighten the sensitivity of executive pay to firm performance. Gerner-Beuerle 
and Kirchmaier 71  examine the impact of the U.K.’s 2013 enhanced executive 
compensation disclosure rules on shareholders’ say-on-pay votes. Using pay 
information disclosed by FTSE 100 firms, they found that shareholders focused on top-
line salaries and seem to disregard the remaining information.  
 
The binding ‘Say on Pay’ vote to date is disappointing although more time and research 
are required to provide more data, especially in the UK. The mixed results of ‘Say on 
Pay’ on executive remuneration should not give rise to complete despondency for three 
reasons. First, the research by Ferri & Maber72 and Correa et al73 are encouraging 
because the advisory ‘Say on Pay’ resolution has a positive impact on heightened 
sensitivity towards poor firm performance. Arguably, the evidence to date shows that 
most shareholders, apart from a few cases report in the media, are not too unhappy with 
the level of executive pay. Rather, they are unhappy with the fact that directors should 
not be paid high wages when the company is performing badly as a result of excessive 
risk-taking. Shareholders are understandably concerned that poor firm performance 
may lead to poor share returns. As such, high executive pay is not the main issue. The 
issues are more about the sensitivity of remuneration to company performance and a  
long-term pay structure.74 
 
Secondly, it appears that ‘Say on Pay’ has increased dialogues between companies and 
institutional investors. 75  Large, institutional investors will have more time and 
resources than small, individual shareholders to monitor directors’ remuneration. 
Finally, the new UK Public Register of publicising listed companies which have faced 
significant shareholder rebellions or have withdrawn resolutions in 2017 intends to 
                                                 
69 I. Gregory-Smith. and B. Main ‘Binding Votes on Executive Remuneration’ 
Working Paper. (2014) Manchester: Royal Economic Society Annual Conference. 
70 R. Correa and U. Lel ‘Say on Pay Laws, Executive Compensation, Pay Slice, and 
Firm Valuation Around the World’ (2013) Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, International Finance Discussion Papers, Number 1084 July 2013 
71 C. Gerner-Beuerle and T. Kirchmaier ‘Say on Pay: Do Shareholders 
Care?’ (2016) Financial Markets Group (FMG) discussion paper no. DP751. 
London: London School of Economics and Political Science. 
72 Ferri and Maber, (n 68) 
73 Correa et al, (n 69) 
74 Edmans (n 51) 
75 S. Mason, A. Medinets and D. Palmon, ‘Say-on-Pay: Is Anybody Listening?’ 
(2012) In AAA 2012 Annual Meeting Paper. 
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have a deterrent effect. Although ‘significant’ is not defined in the new directors’ 
remuneration reporting regime, it is understood from the Directors’ Reporting 
Remuneration Guidance 2016 that it means at least 20% of votes cast against a 
resolution.76 Executive remuneration continues to be of interest for some shareholders. 
38% of resolutions in 2017 received significant votes against or were withdrawn related 
to annual remuneration reports or policies. Apart from having a deterrent effect, this 
Public Register has the benefit of publicising how a company will respond to 
shareholders’ concerns, thus increasing dialogues between the parties. Therefore, 
disclosure of information such as directors’ remuneration should allow more 
transparency and better communication between companies and individual 
shareholders.  
 
The evidence from 2017 shows that some shareholders do utilise the disclosed 
information for voting purposes. Nevertheless, one needs to monitor the future 
percentages of resolutions cast against annual remuneration to achieve a more accurate 
correlation between disclosure of executive remuneration and shareholder activism. 
The literature to date on shareholder activism casts doubt upon the efficacy of 
shareholder activism due to dispersed ownership in the UK. In 2014, overseas 
shareholders owned around 53.8% of shares in the UK market.77 Dispersed ownership 
in the UK makes it difficult for individual investors to monitor companies. With 
Northern Rock, 144,000 of the 180,000 shareholders were found to be individual 
investors with small shareholdings.78 They lacked information or influence to monitor 
the board's performance. Coupled with short-termism of shareholders where the 
average period of share ownership is six months79, shareholders face significant hurdles 
in taking an active part in monitoring directors. 80  The implementation of the 
Stewardship Code in 2011 has increased shareholder participation by 68%.81 Good 
voting turnout at AGMs does not necessarily lead to better engagement, since 
shareholders can purely make noise rather than constructive suggestions. Nonetheless, 
shareholder engagement in some UK companies such as Aviva, AstraZeneca and WPP 
                                                 
76 GC100 and Investor Group, Directors’ Reporting Remuneration Guidance (2016)  
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during the ‘Shareholder Spring’ in 2012 shows that shareholders can play a positive 
role in corporate governance by challenging executive pay packages. 
 
2.3.1 Opportunities for improvements 
 
Disclosure of directors’ remuneration is thus  justified for good corporate governance 
in light of the above three factors. It is also necessary for Britain’s economy in light of 
Brexit. The European Shareholder Rights Directive was adopted in April 2017 and 
Britain has until March 2019 to implement it.  Such implementation is of course, not 
compulsory due to Brexit. However UK law already contains similar provisions. ‘Say 
on Pay’ legislation is incorporated in the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013; 
the Large and Medium-sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) 
(Amendment) Regulations 2013 and the Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and 
Directors' Report) Regulations 2013 in the UK. Essentially, quoted banks in the UK 
must have a binding ‘Say on Pay’ resolution every three years; prescribe the 
requirements of the annual remuneration report and the minimum requirements of the 
directors' remuneration policy. The requirement of a company strategic report would 
provide shareholders with a holistic picture of the entire company’s business model, 
strategy, development, performance and future prospects. Clause D.2.4 of the UK 
Corporate Governance Code invites shareholders to approve all long-term incentive 
schemes. Therefore, the direct impact of Brexit on disclosure directors' pay is likely to 
be relatively minor. 
 
There remains the important balance of attracting talent against a backdrop of calls for 
equality in society. The competitiveness and stability of Britain’ financial industry are 
potentially affected by Brexit. As mentioned earlier, several American and Japanese 
banks are already moving or expanding their offices in Frankfurt in light of the loss of 
passporting rights. The increased competition might revive the argument that bankers 
need to be paid handsomely to retain talent in London. After all, how can banks in 
London attract talent when other European cities or international cities such as Hong 
Kong or Singapore are more appealing? Globalisation has without doubt82, increased 
the remuneration levels in the financial industry. Research by Gabaix & Augustin83 
shows that American firms have grown in size between 1998-2003 due to globalisation. 
As a result of this growth, executive pay has also increased. High executive pay is 
argued to be justified because talent is more important in a globalised world84 and that 
the ‘scalability’ of Chief Executive Officers (CEO) is different to average employees. 
Kaplan’s data driven study supports that the market for talent determines CEO salary.85 
Their high salary is justified because they increase the value of the companies they 
work for and they are dismissed for poor performance. The average term for a CEO of 
a Standard  & Poor’s 500 company is six years in 2013 in comparison to eight years in 
1998.86 Kaplan’s view contrasts to the established view in corporate governance that 
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executive pay is linked to company performance.87 In his opinion, the media tend to 
focus on the very high CEO pay and corporate scandals when the reality is not as 
sensational. Over the past 15 years, the median CEO pay has remained almost the same 
but the mean CEO pay has decreased a great deal. CEO pay is therefore a reflection of 
supply and demand in the job market. Kaplan’s results are supported by a UK study in 
2016. A study into the executive pay of the CEOs of the FTSE 350 companies shows 
that the median pay is £1.9 million in 2014. This is a rise of 82% since 2011. At the 
same time however, increase of invested capital is less than 1%.88 Talent therefore 
drives executive pay. 
 
One can argue that CEOs are only part of the bigger employee workforce in a company. 
Why treat CEOs in a special way? The answer is that there is evidence to show that 
CEOs matter in life and death. Two research papers of 201789 support the argument that 
CEOs bring positive impact to companies in the long-term. Flammer and Pratima’s 
study shows that there is a causal connection between giving long-term incentives for 
executives and improved company performance. In particular, their results reveal that 
shareholders’ proposals of long-term incentives to executives improve both firm value 
and operating performance. Company strategies and stakeholder relationships are also 
improved as a result of long-term incentives. The second paper by Edmans et al 
reinforces the long-term structure of executive remuneration. Their use of ‘vesting 
equity’ (the amount of stock and options scheduled to vest in a given quarter) leads to 
CEOs cutting investment on long-term research and design projects and increase short-
term earnings. Thus, they call for giving CEOs long-term incentives so that CEOs can 
implement long-term investments in research and design. CEOs contracts therefore 
affect real boardroom decisions. 
 
Equally, two research papers of 2015 and 201490 show that the departure and death of 
CEOs can have negative impacts on company value and performance. Besides, a CEO’s 
decision to introduce the use of new technology will have a bigger effect in a large 
company than in a smaller one.91 The scalability of average employees is not entirely 
dependent on the company size. If the maximum of cars an employee can fix is ten a 
day, it does not matter whether the company has 500 or 5,000 cars. Rewards are thus 
higher for strategic and managerial talents than pure labour.  
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Nonetheless, the argument ignores the fact that poor strategies and management can 
have negative impacts on companies. The financial crisis of 2007-2009 has revealed 
several examples of poor strategies and management amongst certain UK banks.92 
Therefore, sensitivity of executive pay and company performance matters. The 
advisory ‘Say on Pay’ proves to be effective in heightening this sensitivity. Once there 
is such sensitivity, shareholders will hopefully scrutinise the CEOs’ actions in more 
detail. Transparency and disclosure are thus necessary to give shareholders access to 
information to make informed decisions. Disclosure of directors’ remuneration can 
work both ways. From a company’s perspective, more information available to 
shareholders potentially gives them more ammunition to rely upon at annual general 
meetings. Companies should see this not as an inconvenience, but as an opportunity to 
open dialogues, discuss and resolve matters with shareholders. Nevertheless, more 
disclosure provides transparency, which in turn should increase public trust and 
investor confidence.  
 
It is important to note however, the disclosure should contain accessible information, 
which an average person can understand. Disclosing copious amounts of information 
is neither sensible nor useful. UK law requires a great deal of disclosure by listed 
companies, as seen above. In the modern era where digital technology is increasingly 
popular, it is proposed that such disclosure should be made on digital platforms or 
mobile applications for shareholders to access. In late 2015, Jimmy Choo worked with 
Equiniti to produce the first digital platform allowing shareholders to vote online at 
annual general meetings (AGM). The AGM mobile application was created as a native 
app (Android and iOS). The app works by directly integrating with the AGM software, 
which contains information of a physical AGM such as attendance, voting and 
presentations. Through the app, shareholders can ask questions and vote on resolutions. 
Shareholders’ identities and credentials are verified. They also need to enter a ‘Meeting 
ID’ code before they can vote online. Evidence from this Jimmy Choo online AGM 
reveals that shareholder engagement in 2016 is much better than the physical AGM in 
2015.93 
 
Technology can improve shareholder engagement and there is interest from other 
companies to develop online voting.94 Publishing dense strategic and directors’ reports 
in a traditional format does not appeal to busy, time-poor investors, especially 
individual investors. However, useful information from such reports can also be fed 
into mobile applications and be presented in accessible format. Many mobile 
applications utilise artificial intelligence such as machine learning and predictive 
analysis to monitor and predict users’ preferences according to their search histories. 
The authors submit that it would be useful to have a mobile application that can send 
personalised, tailored disclosure of company information such as directors’ 
remuneration, strategy and company performance to shareholders. Keywords, 
summaries and links to remuneration, strategy and performance should be accessible 
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through the mobile app. Paper copies of reports should still be available for 
shareholders but digital technology should allow shareholders to access such 
information at their convenience and enjoy more tailored information. By remembering 
and storing a shareholder’s preferences and search histories, algorithms can personalise 
the reports. 
 
Ultimately, directors’ remuneration should be decided by company remuneration 
committees. It is not for governments to decide the level of executive pay. Regulation 
is often reactive, driven by political will rather than shareholders’ wishes. The 
American experience in regulating executive pay for 80 years has taught us that a web 
of remuneration schemes were developed as a result of regulatory arbitrage. In brief, 
their attempt to regulate pay was unsuccessful and produced counterproductive 
payment schemes. It is right however, for a government to increase stakeholders’ 
influence on executive pay. The Conservative government has not adopted the call for 
an annual, binding ‘Say on Pay’ vote. However, it will introduce secondary legislation 
to incorporate more disclosure requirements. It will require listed companies to publish 
their annual pay ratios between CEOs and their employees.95 It also requires companies 
to explain in their strategic reports how directors comply with section 172 Companies 
Act 2006 and have regard to employees’ interests. The government has asked the 
Financial Reporting Council to revise the UK Corporate Governance Code to be more 
specific about the steps that listed companies should take when they encounter 
significant shareholder opposition (likely to be 20% or more) to remuneration and other 
resolutions. The tone of the government’s response suggests that it will rely mainly on 
the ‘comply or explain’ style of the UK Corporate Governance Code. It is prepared, 
however, to be more prescriptive and legislate if the ‘comply or explain’ style fails to 
deliver. It is hoped that listed companies will comply with the new disclosure 
requirements as legislation can create its own problems. Much depends on the 
government’s ability not to bow down to city lobbyists.96 Finally, even if the disclosure 
requirements lead to a reduction of executive pay through a ‘Say on Pay’ vote, they 
only cures one weakness of the bigger corporate governance framework in the UK and 
it might not have a lasting effect. The success of the ‘Say on Pay’ vote depends largely 
on shareholder activism. The fact is that overseas investors own 53.8% of shares in UK 
listed companies. 97  Shareholder activism on a yearly basis voting on executive 
remuneration in a dispersed ownership jurisdiction is thus difficult.98 
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2.5 Conclusion 
Legally, Brexit will have a limited impact on UK law on executive remuneration. This 
paper looked at three specific areas of executive remuneration namely: the bonus cap, 
the clawback of pay, the level of disclosure needed by shareholders regarding details 
of directors’ remuneration and the extent to which shareholder approval is needed. A 
great deal of the law set out in EU directives and regulations are already implemented 
in UK law. Besides, public sentiment for equality in society and the general anxiety 
over the Brexit negotiations will probably maintain the status quo: certainly in the 
foreseeable future until the outcomes of the trade deals are clearer. However, people’s 
memories fade with time. Britain needs to compete with other important financial 
centres globally in a post-Brexit era. Competition is fierce and talent has become more 
important. Incentives are required to attract talent to London’s financial sector. High 
executive pay is justified as CEOs’ scalability is different to average employees’. Most 
shareholders accept the level of executive pay, contrasted to the public’s anger towards 
unfairness in compensation and distrust of big companies. Sensitivity of executive 
compensation and company performance is heightened with advisory ‘Say on Pay’ 
votes. Continuation of this should be pursued as this should encourage shareholders to 
engage more with companies, scrutinising CEOs’ actions and decisions, leading to 
better corporate governance. Disclosure of directors’ remuneration is required to 
provide more voice to shareholders. An opportunity arises with digital technology such 
as mobile applications. They may create better access to such information and 
personalised services. European legislation in corporate governance has addressed the 
issue of executive remuneration. Britain now has the choice to remain the status quo, 
repeal part or all of the law on executive remuneration. In practice, much depends on 
political will and market forces. Brexit brings both challenges and opportunities to 
Britain. It is now up to the government and companies working together for a new 
Britain after Brexit. 
 
 
 
